We construct the belief function that quantifies the agent' beliefs about which event of Q will occurred when he knows that the event is selected by a chance set-up and that the probability function associated to the chance set up is only partially known.
INTRODUCTION.
1) The use of belief functions to quantify degrees of belief is muddled by problems that result from the confusion between belief and lower probabilities (or between plausibility and upper probabilities). Beliefs can be induced by many types of information. In this paper, we consider only one very special case: beliefs induced on a frame of discernment Q when the clements of Q will be selected by a random process. It seems reasonable to defend the idea that the belief of an event should be numerically equal to the probability of that event. This principle is called the Hacking Frequency Principle (Hacking 1965) .
But there are cases where the p robability function that governs the random process is not exaclly known. This lack of knowledge can be encountered when probabil itics are partially defined or when data are missing. As an example, suppose an urn where there arc 100 balls. Its composition is not exactly known. All that is kn own is that there are between 30 and 40 black balls, between 10 and 50 white balls, and the other are red. What is your belief that the next randomly selected ball will be black? Suppose you have selected 50 balls at random w ith replacement and you have observed 15 black balls, 20 white, 10 reds and 5 'not black'. What is your belief now that there are between 35 and 37 black balls? What is your belief now that the next randomly selected ball will be black? These are the problems we solve in this paper.
In this paper, we accept that beliefs are quantified by belief functions, as described in the transferable belief model (Smets 1990b, Smets and Kennes 1994) . The transferable belief model is a model for quantified beliefs developed independently of any underlying probabilistic model. It is neither Dempster's model nor iL<; today versions (Shafer, 1990 , Kohlas, 1994 . It is n ot a model based on inner measures (Halpern and Fagin, 1990 ).
What we study here is just a special case of belief function. We study the belief induced by the knowledge of the existence of an objective chance set up that generates random events according to a probability function, probability function that happens to be only partially known to us.
2) Suppose a frame of discernmen t .Q, i.e., a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive events such as one and only one of them is true (we accept the close world assumption (Smets 1988) ). Suppose the true element will be selected by a chance process. Let P:2 n � [O,l] be the probability function over n w here P(A) for A<;;; Q quantifies the probability (chance) that the selected clement is in A. We accept that this probability measure is "objective". The problem is to assess Your degree of belief. You denotes the agent who hold the beliefs. Your beliefs arc quantified by a belief function bel:2 n --7[0,1], about the fact that the selected element is in A, given You only have some partial knowledge about the value of P. Should You know P, then by Hackin g Frequency Principle (1965) Your degree of belief bei(A) for each A<;;; Q should be equal to P(A): If You know that P(A) = PA VA C:Q then bel(A) = PA VA C:Q In that case bel is a probability function over Q. But remember that bel and P do not have the same meaning; they only share the same values. P quantifies the probability (chance) of the events in Q, bel quantifies the belief over Q induced in You by the knowledge of the value of the probabilities. P exists independently of me; bel cannot exist if You do not exist.
Let lP n be the set of probability functions over Q. Suppose that You know only that the probability function p that governs the random process over n is an element of a subset.:?-' of lP n · The problem is to determine Your belief about Q given You know only that Pis an element of.:?-'(but You do not know which one).
In many cases, !?' is uniquely defined by its upper and lower probabilities functions P* and P* where: P*(A) = min { P(A) : PE� bcln ( P) (X) for any subset X of Q is numerically equal to the probability P(X) given to X.
By construction, beln {P) results from the marginalizing ofbclw{PJ over 0.:
vxcn Hacking Freque n cy P rinc i ple implies the n e x t requirement.
Let n(P) = cyl( {P)) <;;; ; W, then n(P) =: u ( {P(�)}, Ul i ) by tEN 2.1. Thus belw { P l(cyl(X)) = belw(cyl(X)I1t(P) We study now the case where IQI = 2. Let n = {S, F) where S and F denote Success and Failure, respectively. We introduce an extra assumption.
for every o��b�c�d� 1.
It is equival ent to assuming that mw(a) is null except if a = (a, 1]. The origin of the assumption is to be found in the meaning of the bbd. The bbd mw(a) for � [0, 1] is that part of belief (a density here) that supports the fact that P(S)e a (and P(F)e a). Suppose we condition mw on S.
Each bbd mw(a) is transferred to (a, S)r;;, w. Requirement 2 means that if after conditioning on S a bbd supports P(S) = x e [0,1], it also supports every value in [0, 1] larger than x. Observing a success could support P(S) = .
3, but that support should then also be given to P(S) = .4 etc ....
This assumption means that each focal element is a step function that starts from ({0). F), jumps from the F domain to the S domain at some a in [0, 1] , and ends at ( { 1 J, S) (see figure 1 ).
Finally, if we apply again the Hacking Frequency Principle, we obtain after conditioning on 9= {P) with
The second equality results from the fact that only those bbd that jump before p will touch ( {p}, S) and bcJ n {Pl (S) is equal to the integral of those bbd that touch ( { p}, S). Derivating both terms on p implies that:
In conc lusio n we have derived the bbd on w when IQI = 2.
Some properties can be easily derived.
1) Suppose the agent knows that.9'= {P: a::; P(S)::; b, 0 �a < b � I}. We condition mw on the cylindric al extension of [a, b) . The bbd mw(A) for Ar;;, w is transferred to A ncyl([a, b)). belv/'tS) is the integral of all the bbd that touch only S after conditioning on cyl((a, b]), i.e., those bbd that jump to S before a: a
Similarly plw9tS) is the integral of all the bbd that touch S, i.e., that jump to S before b:
0 This result should not be extrapolated blindly to higher dimensions (see section 4 ).
2) The case IQI = 2 can be nicely represented by figure 2 (Smets, 1978) . Each point in the triangle corresponds to one interval of (0,1]. In general, if positive bbd are given only to intervals, we assign the bbd given to [a,b] In the present case (1. -by a success is:
The belief function induced by 'SuF' is the vacuous belief function that reflect the state of total ignorance in which You are after just learning the tautology 'SuF'. Hence we can just as well drop all 'vacuous' results and assume n = r+s.
The commonality function induced by r successes and s failures in n independent (Bemoullian) trials is obtained by multiplying the corresponding commonality functions.
Hence:
In that case, by derivating q!P n ([a,b) I r, s ) and appropriate normalization, we get:
where r is the gamma function. 
T+S+
This result shows that the observed proportion is an excellent approximation of beln if r+s is not too small.
4. CASE WITH IQI = 3.
Suppose 1!11 = 3 where n = {A, B, C}. 1P n can be represented by an equilateral triangle where each point corresponds to an element of 1P n . The three heights are equal to the three probabilities P(A), P(B) and �(C): Th _ e height of such a triangle is 1 and the length of 1L<; s1de IS equal to -f413.
By requirem ent 1, we know that the focal elements of m w can be represented by:
( .9'A , A) v ( _9E, B)v�c. C) where (9'-'A, .9E, �) are the elements of a partiti on of !P n .
In order to specify the form of the subsets_9X, XE (A, B, C}, we consider the conditioning of mw on the sct.9'i c:
IPn where This set .9'L corresponds to the subset of 1P n w here P(A)E [0, ai] and P(B) and P(C) are l inearly related to P(A). Requirement 3 states that, after conditioning mw on.9i, the bbd so obtained on the spacc .9-L is identical to those obtained when 101=2 (indeed every clement of the new subdomain is characterized by P(A) as when IQ1 = 2).
Therefore after further conditioning on A, the focal elements on.9L should be of the form of intervals [a, a1l (see figure 3) . This requirement is sufficient in order to derive the structure of the focal elements of mw.
A A B Figure 3 : Explanation of Requirement 3. Left figure: the IP n space with I.QI = 3, and the9l domain. Middle figure: a bbd that satisfies Requirement 3. Right figure: a bbd that does not satisfy Requirement 3 the ' integral ' of all the bbd given to the focal elements .9\q) such that Xc:.9-'A(q). Figure 4 shows the structure of the partition so generated. It can then be proved that the only function mw symmetric in the three arguments of q that satisfies (4.3)
for every (a, b. c) E IP n is the function mw(.9'{q)) = {3
for every qE IP n · A Figure 4 : Structure of the domain of mw and one example of bbd labeled q when IQI = 3. The shaded area is §-lA(q).
Some properties derived from this solution arc detailed.
1)
Iff?-'= [(.5, 0, .5), (.5, .5, 0)}, then mn(A) = l/3, mn(B) = mn(C) :::: 0, m.n (AuB) :::: mn(AuC) = l/6, mn(BuC) = 1/3, mn(AuBuC) = 0. This result merits some reflection. One might be surprised that even though P(A) :::: .5 is exactly known, one does not have beln(A) = .5. If the frame had been A versus A, the critic would have been appropriate, except that in such a fram e we just have the required resul ts. The difference observed here reflects the fact that there are three clements. What is nice is that the pignistic probability induced in this case is such that BetP(A) = .5 (the pignistic transformation is detailed in next section). 
2)

4)
Suppose You know that §-lis characterized by a lower probability function P* on .n. Let P * be the upper probability function dual of P*, i.e., P * (X) = 1 -P .. (X)
for X�Q. Let a= P*{A), b = P*(B), c = P * (C), A= P*(A), B = P*(B), C = P*(C). The belief on Q induced by the set &?.'of probability distributions P on .n compatible with the upper and lower probabilities (i.e., VA c::: n, P ..
. (A):S:P(A):-;;? *(A)) is given by:
A m(A)
Figure 5: Domain of P.Q when 101 = 3. The hexagon represents the set f?-' of probability functions compatible with a given lower probability function. The values of mn(A 1.:7-) and mn(AuB 1.9} are the shaded surfaces. mn(AuBuC I f?-j is the surface of the hexagon plus the three small left over triangles fixed on its side.
These results are obtained by computing the various surfaces described in figure 5 .
It is worth noticing that bel is not equal toP*, even when P* is a belief function. Why should they? The transferable belief model never requires that the belief function that quantities our belief should be the lower envelop of a set of probability function.
5. PIGNISTIC PROBABILITY.
In Smets (1990a Smets ( , 1993 We study how decision should be made when beliefs are induced by a set of probabilities, i.e., how to derive the appropriate pignistic probability from the in i tial belief induced by the knowledge that Pe� IP Q· The choice of the appropriate betting frame is important. We could think to build the belief function over Q that quantifies our belief over Q and apply the pignistic transformation to such a belief function over Q using Q as the betting frame. But this is an erroneous strategy as the betting frame is not Q but W. The beliefs induced by Pe .9'is a belief over W, the belief derived on Q is only the result of the marginalization of the first one on n.
Using W as the betting frame, we apply the pignistic transformation to Belw. For X<: IP n let S(X) be the surface of X. Suppose the agent who wants to bet on Q knows only that PE .9: The pignistic transformation implies that the bbd mw ( .:?-{q)) given to j'{q) (see (4.2)) be equally distributed among the elements of :7'.
S (.9'A(q)n9J
BetPQ ( hence:
Pe §-'
The pignistic probability BetPn(A ) so derived is equivalent to the probability one would derive by assuming an equi a priori density over rPn. conditioning it on 9, and computing the expected probability of P(A).
In particular, when IQI = 2 and §-'= [a, b), the result is:
These are quite natural results. BetPn(. I .9) indeed happens to be the center of gravity of §-'", but its dcri vat ion does not result from the use of an equi a priori density over !P n· It just happens that both approaches lead to the same results: 1) the equi a priori density over !Pn and 2) the application of the pignistic transformation combined with the evaluation of BetP n (X I� as Bet.Pw(cyl(X) 1.97 for X<: Q, where BetPw is the pignistic probability obtained from belw( . IYj over the betting frame W.
CONCLUSIONS:
1) Generalization to 1.01 > 3 is conceptually easy, but very laborious when solutions must be written down. Nothing new comes out of it. In practice, computation will not been based on the explicit equations, but on some Monte
Carlo method.
2) Generalization of the procedure can be achieved if one has a non-degenerated belief function on !P Q if there are only a finite number of subsets of !P n that receive positive basic belief masses (more general cases are not considered here). Let (.;?-l1: i= 1, 2 ... n} be the set of focal elements of beliP n with their basic belief masses miP0�). For each focal element.q', we derive belw( . I PE�) over W. The belief function belw over Q induced {(.:
3) Suppose two pieces of evidence that say that Pe §-'1 and PE.0'2, respectively. The combination of these two pieces of evidence leads to the knowledge Pe.9'ln9'2·
One could build bell on W as the belief function induced by the knowledge that Pe.99. . Identically, one could build bel2 on W as the belief function induced by the knowledge that Pe.9'2. One could then be tempted, erroneously in fact, to combine bel 1 and bel2 into bel1 EBbel2 by Dempster's rule of combination.
One could also build bel12 on W as the belief function induced by the knowledge that PE.9'1 rl9'2. In general bcl12 ;<:bell (Bbel2. Only bel 1 2 is correct. Indeed Dempster's rule of combination is applicable iff both pieces of evidence are distinct, and distinctness is not satisfied in the present context because of the existence of a unique underlying probability function on Q that create a link between the two pieces of evidence.
4)
In conclusion, the knowledge that the probability function P over n belongs to some subset .9' of IP n permits the construction of a belief function bel over IP n x Q and over n. It must be enhanced that in general the belief function beln induced over Q by a lower probability function P"' will not satisfy beln = P* even if Smets, 1987 , Smets and Kennes, 1994 , Halpern and Fagin, 1990 The present paper shows that prior ignorance about three or more exclusive alternatives and the emergence of partiall y ordered beliefs when evidence is obtained defy representation by any single set of distributions, but yield to a representation based on several sets. The partial order is shown to be a partial qualitative probability which shares some intuitively appealing attributes with probability distributions.
INTRODUCTION
Probability distributions have long bee n advocated as a useful foundation for the modeling of beliefs. The best known form of probabilistic belief representation consists of a single distribution. Such models bring with them a well-developed normative theory of behavior in the face of risk (Savage, 1972) which has had many adherents over th e years.
Recently, some researchers have concluded that single distribution models are too restrictive. Beliefs may not always be completely ordered by the believer, even though a single probability distnbution necessaril y represents them as being so. Nevertheless, other attributes of probability distributions do seem like accurate portrayals of how beliefs behave with respect to Boolean combinations of the underlying events, and of how beliefs change in the f8ce of evidence. Some of these desirable attri butes are peculiar to probability distributions. So, to have the attn butes, a belief representation must either use probability distributions or else use measures that agree with some probability distributions (Snow, 1992) .
One way to get the desirable attributes of probabilities without the undesirable restrictiveness of a compJete ordering is to model beliefs using non-singleton sets of probability distributions. It is often convenient to use convex sets of probability distributions, which arise as solutions to systems of simultaneous linear inequalities.
Many natural language expressions of belief are easily translated into linear inequality constraints (Nilsson, 1986 ), e.g. "This event is at least as likely as that one." Linear constraint systems can be revised simply by Bayes' formula (Snow, 1991) . Although there is a diversity of opinion about how set estimates might inform decision making, there are useful suggestions for decision rules in the literature (for a review, see Sterling and Morren, 199 1).
As versatile as convex sets are, there are reasonable belief patterns that convex sets fail to represent. For example, the set of posterior probabilities derived from a convex set of priors and a convex set of conditionals is generall y not convex (White, 1986) . Further, some important constraints are non-linear. Kyburg and Pittarell i (1992) discuss the non-convex sets which arise from the non linear assumption of independence between events.
The present paper explores a circumstance where no single set of probability distributions, convex or otherwise, faithfully represents a reasonable pattern of belief: namely, ignorance being overcome by evidence when there are more than two alternatives. By ignorance, we mean that the believer is unwilling to · assert any non-trivial prior ordering among the sentences of interest. By being overcome by evidence, we mean that the believer will assert some non-trivial orderings if the contrast between the conditional probabilities for the evidence given the senten<:es is suffi ciently impressive.
A probabilistic solution to the representation of ignorance being overcome by evidence is presented. Although the model is more complex than a single set of probability distributions, the orderings that arise have much in common with single posterior probability distributions, and inference about the orderings is computationally inexpensive.
NOTATION AND ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT IGNORANCE
In this paper, we sball use the notation S >e> T to denote the condition that the believer asserts that sentence Sis, with a warr ant satisfactory to the believer, at least as belief�worthy as sentence Tin light of evidence e.
If evidence e does not lead the believer to assert an ordering of sentences S and T, then we write S ?e? T
The condition of having no relevant evidence is indicated by the particle nil, as in S ?nil? T which expression denotes that there is no ordering between some sentences S and T in the absence of evidence.
We shall assume that the sentences of interest belong to a partitioned domain, which is defined as fo llows;
Definition. A partitioned domain is a set comprising: We shall assume throughout that the atoms in the domain are collectively exhaustive, that is, one of the atoms is true. This additional assumption places little epistemological burden on the believer (at worst, it means that one of the atoms is "none of the other atoms are true"), and has the convenient effect that every sentence in the domain has an equivalent simple disjunction. Finally, although infinite domains are useful in such applications as statistical hypothesis testing, we shall assume throughout this paper that the number of atoms in the domain is finite.
Our first assum ptions about ignorance, and the conquest of ignorance by evidence express the fo llowing ideas. If no evidence has yet bee n observed, and the question of relative belief-worthiness is not answerable on logical grounds, then there is no satisfactory warrant to order one sentence ahead of another. Even after evidence has been observed, the question may remain open. Once a commitment to an ordering is made, then other commitments may be inferred by conditional probability considerations. A belief-ordering consistency principle discussed by Sugeno (unpublished dissertation, cited in Prade, 1985) AS. (Recovery from ignorance about atoms) For exclusive atoms s and t, and non-nil evidence e, a neceswy condition fo r s >e> t is that p( e I s ) >= p( e I t ), and if p( e t s ) > 0, then the inequality is strict. If p( e I s ) > 0, then p( e I t ) = 0 is not a necessary condition fo r s >e> t.
A6. (Dominance) For any sentences S, T, U and U where (S and U) and (T and U) are both fa lse and U implies U, and fo r all evidence e, including nil, if( S or U) >e> (Tor U ), then S >e> T, and if ( S >e> T ), then ( S or U ) >e> ( T or U' ).
COMMENTARY ON THE ASSUMPTIONS
Assumption Al explains one circumstance where we decline to assert any ordering: when there is no evidence, and the one sentence doesn't imply the other. A2 restricts the scope of the assumptions to problems whose givens rule out no prior probability distribution over the atoms. The conditions in assumption A2 reflect the easily-shown fa ct that a disjunctive conditional like p( e I S ) is a convex combination of the conditionals fo r the atoms in S, with weights proportional to the prior probabilities of the atoms.
Assumption A3 says that we always assert an ordering
